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I
Until comparatively recently, the development of the atomic energy industry has
progressed almost as if state governments did not exist in the political organization
of the country. Under the conditions which prevailed prior to 1954, it is not surprising that they played so insignificant a role. Activities in the field were almost
exclusively a concern of the national government: almost all important facilities
were owned by the national government; means of finance were provided by the
national taxing power; major policy decisions were made by national officials and
were hidden from state governments by a cloak of high security; and private organizations, to the extent they participated in the development of the industry (which
they did to a very great extent), functioned primarily as agents of the national
government. State governments, accordingly, could reasonably remain unconcerned.
Such detachment on the part of the states, however, is no longer tenable today.
With the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,1 there have occurred three
important changes, each of which has far-reaching significance for state govern2

ments:

First, a new legal class of private parties active in the atomic energy field has
been created, namely, licensees under the 1954 act. Heretofore, private persons and
organizations operated atomic energy facilities and possessed special nuclear material and source material as employees, agents, or contractors of the national govern* The material presented in this article was assembled, in part, under a research grant from the
School of Industrial Management Research Fund at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, made
possible by assistance from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. It is an expansion of ideas expressed
by Professor Krebs in an address, entitled The Role of the States-A First Look, before the Atomic
Industrial Forum in New York City, May 24, 1955, and in remarks before the Public Utilities Section
of the American Bar Association at the annual meeting of the Association in Philadelphia, August 23,
'955.
tA.B. 1938, LL.B 1941, Yale University. Member of the New York and Massachusetts bars; Associate Professor of Law, Massachusetts Institute of Technology School of Industrial Management; Executive
Secretary of the New England Committee on Atomic Energy; and member of the Special Committee
on Atomic Energy of the Bar Association of the City of New York, Formerly counsel to the Atomic
Energy Commission and general counsel to the National Science Foundation.
4:A.B. 1948, Yale University; LL.B. 195i, Harvard University. Member of the Massachusetts bar;
Assistant to the Manager of the Convair Atomic Industrial Development Project. Formerly Teaching
Fellow at Harvard Law School and Research Associate at Massachusetts Institute of Technology School
of Industrial Mangement.
1 68 STAT. 921, 42 U.S.C.A. § 201x-28i (Supp. 1954). This statute is hereinafter referred to as the
1954 act.
'These changes add to, rather than replace, the existing pattern of legal control of peaceful atomic
development; with respect to military applications of atomic energy, the pre-existing pattern subsists in the
main.
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ment. Henceforth, many of them will engage in similar activities in the capacity of
licensees, incapable of invoking a federal immunity to shield themselves from state
laws and regulations.
Second, the locus of initiative for many important decisions is shifting away from
the national government. Heretofore, the power to determine the course of all
major developments in the atomic energy field has rested exclusively with the
national government. Henceforth, the capacity to make important decisions affecting atomic energy development will also be vested in hundreds of private corporations, state agencies, and state subdivisions.
A third change, attributable as much to the advancing state of atomic art as to
the passage of the 1954 act, is in the kind and pace of atomic energy development.
Nuclear reactors for the production of power are under construction. Increasingly
they will be privately financed. Uses of radioactive isotopes are soaring. Various
commercially attractive operations are on the horizon. Research fostered by both
private and public funds is being pushed at an increasing tempo. And elements of
competition are gradually making entrance upon the atomic scene.
From each of these changed conditions will emanate novel, challenging problems
for state governments, some of which can be perceived today and some of which will
undoubtedly remain unnoticed for a time. Although the full significance of these
changes for the states can be foreseen only partially, it is possible, with respect to
each of them, to indicate a measure of their impact. While separate analysis of
these changes is necessary in order to understand their interplay, it should be remembered that in many situations, their effects will be overlapping and cumulative.
The Change in Legal Status
The great change in the law, relevant to this article, results from sections 41, 'o,
io3, and 104 of the 1954 act,' which, for the first time, permit private ownership

of facilities designed to produce or utilize special nuclear material; and from sections
53 and 54,4 which permit the AEC to make large quantities of special nuclear
materials available to private parties for suitable purposes, under appropriate licenses
issued by the Commission. The significance of this change can be illustrated by the
case of a utility company which has decided to build and operate a power reactor.
Unlike the contractor-operators at Hanford, Oak Ridge, or Savannah River, the
utility company will, as a private entity rather than agent of the national government, be subject to state controls and policies on many sides, in addition to federal
controls and policies-and in some cases, it may be caught in a cross-fire between
them. Moreover, since "state controls and policies" are not necessarily a homogeneous, consistent set of regulations, but rather are more likely to be rules, regulations, and procedures formulated, in many instances, long prior to the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 and administered by a wide range of state agencies, the licensee may
very well find them, as applied to its activities, at best uncoordinated and at worst
'68
'68

STAT. 928, 936, 937, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2051, 2131, 2133, 2134 (Supp. 1954).
STAT. 930, 93r, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2073, 2074 (Supp. 1954).
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quite at odds with one another. Since each state agency is ordinarily charged by
one or more statutes with responsibility for a limited number of specific activities
or conditions, such diversity should not be unexpected. A company engaging in
the exploitation of atomic energy and having activities which bring it within the
jurisdiction of several state agencies can, therefore, anticipate the necessity for threading a careful way through the fabric of state control.
Specific problems can be isolated by listing separately each executive department,
agency, board, and commission in a particular state and determining whether such
organization is charged with responsibility over one or more phases of the activities
of atomic energy licensees within the state.0 The following examples illustrate new
state powers and responsibilities, some involving possible jurisdictional conflicts:
Heretofore, the AEC has had exclusive responsibility for controlling the radiation
hazards created by the operation of its reactors. Once a private utility begins to
operate a reactor, however, the state public health department, in addition to the
AEC, may legitimately concern itself with possible hazards created for the public at
large, and it may not apply the same safety standards as the AEC. In addition, the
state labor department often has responsibilities for the occupational safety of the
personnel at the installation, and it may apply safety standards which differ from
those of both the AEC and the state public health department A real conflict may
possibly arise between the regulations-i.e., not only may one set be more stringent
than another, but compliance with one set may necessarily involve violation of a
different set.
Heretofore, there have been no reactors built by private utilities with their own
money as additions to their generating capacity. Hence, state public utility commissions have not had responsibility for approving their construction or financing.
Now, a state public utilities commission may have to issue a certificate of convenience
and necessity before the utility can devote its funds to the construction of such a
In Massachusetts, for example, each of the following state agencies will probably have to widen its
field of activities to include problems arising from atomic energy development:
Public Health Department
State Planning Board
Department of Public Utilities
Port of Boston Authority
Department of Banking and Insurance
Airport Authorities
Labor Department
Aeronautics Commission
Public Safety Department
Highway Commission
Department of Industrial Accidents
Weather Control Commission
Department of Taxation
Agriculture Department
Industrial Development Commission
Department of Education
Commerce Department
Conservation Department
State Library Board
Commission on Uniform State Laws
State University Board
Commission on Interstate Cooperation.
This list includes organs of state government charged with educational and promotional functions as
well as those with regulatory responsibility.
'In New York, for instance, the Department of Health adopted comprehensive regulations dealing
with ionizing radiation, effective Sept. 1, 1955, N. Y. STATE SANITARY CODE C. XVI; the Department
of Labor is in the process of adopting regulations establishing conditions for work in radiation areas,
Proposed Industrial Code Rule No. 38, pending before the Board of Standards and Appeals; and the
City of New York has additional regulations applicable to persons within its jurisdiction. SANITAtY
Con, NEw YORK CIT DEP'T OF HEALTH §107a.

THE RoLE

oF THE STATES

new facility. The state commission will have before it questions of considerable
complexity and magnitude: Is it sound policy for the utility, at this time, to build
into its system a generating facility of unknown reliability and clearly uneconomic
function rather than wait five or ten years for the uncertainties to be resolved? What
will be the proper allocation of the excess costs incurred in bringing atomic power
into the system as between investors and rate payers, present and future? Are the
consumers adequately protected against inadequate fuel-element supply? Can a
utility participate in the construction and operation of a reactor located outside of
the state and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the commission?T
Heretofore, the location of new reactors was exclusively within the control of
the AEC. Now, not only the state governments, but even local authorities and business interests will also be able to assert some degree of control. At the state level,
one can expect the public utilities commission, the department of public health, and
perhaps the state planning board, the department of conservation, and the department of agriculture to play a part in the ultimate decision. The local interests will
find expression in special legislative acts, zoning regulations, building codes, private
restrictions, and political mechanisms of many kinds. Whether these interests view
a power reactor in the neighborhood as a prize to be sought or a nuisance to be
abated may have considerable effect upon atomic power development in the state.
It is likely that the capacity of any given drainage basin to carry radioactive
wastes from reactor coolant discharges is finite and will limit the number of power
reactors which can be located on the particular river system involved. The adjustment
of local, state, and interstate interests in the development of water supplies for agricultural, industrial, and consumer uses has, in the past, sometimes been regulated
by interstate compact as well as by individual state agencies. State officials will,
accordingly, play a central role in determining the best way in which to mesh such
interests with the progressive utilization of such drainage basin capacity resulting
from AEC approval of successive license applications.
Not all of the state activity engendered by the creation of the legal class of atomic
energy licensees will be of a regulatory and control nature. The states have, or
should have, as much interest in obtaining for their citizens the fruits and profits
from the new industry as they have in guarding them against the potential hazards
of careless utilization of atomic power. The appropriate state agencies now have good
reason to undertake educational and promotional activities to call to the attention
of the industrial leaders in their states the advantages to be gained through use of
atomic power and radioactive isotopes in their operations, to encourage the education and training of their qualified citizens in the various specialities necessary to
meet the demands of a growing industry, and to educate the public at large about
the benefits to be obtained through the uses of atomic power. Such agencies can
also publicize the adequacy of measures in effect to protect the public health and
safety against potential radiation hazards.
'For a discussion of these and related problems, see Pike, Model State Law for Atomic Energy
Regulation, 55 PUB. UTIL. FoRT. 668 (1955).
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In short, all of the state agencies which have any control over, or responsibility
to promote, any one or more of the manifold activities in which a private concern
may engage in its utilization of atomic energy for peaceful uses have a role to play
in connection with the development of this new industry. The general objective
of each state should be twofold: to secure for its citizens as many of the benefits of
the industry as possible, and to protect its citizens from its potential hazards. One
can safely assume that the AEC will remain alert to its responsibilities in both of
these areas on a national basis. The time has come, however, for each state also to
become alert to its own responsibilities within its borders and to take steps to see
that its laws and policies, at all levels of government, are realistically adapted to meet
the needs of the new situation.
The Change in Locus of Initiative
The second new condition which has been suggested as having an impact upon
state responsibilities is the change in the locus of the initiative for important decisions about atomic energy development-from the AEC to the managements of
many diverse organizations, private and public. The incidence of this change will
fall primarily upon the developmental and promotional functions which many state
governments have assumed, and which may be of unique importance in the pattern
of development in a new industry.
So long as atomic energy remained nationally directed, decisions as to the erection
of new facilities, their location, and design were matters within the exclusive control
of the AEC and were influenced primarily by considerations of national strategic
and economic policy and possibly, to some extent, by political forces. Similar decisions, when entertained now by the management of a public utility company, however, will undoubtedly be substantially influenced by other considerations and
through other channels. It would seem safe to observe that probable economic
consequences will weigh heavily in the scales. For example, the decision to build
a costly power reactor which will operate at a loss in an electric utility system is
likely to be made sooner by a company in a high power-cost area than by one in a
low power-cost area; likewise, it will likely be made sooner by a company in a state
which taxes utility income than by one in a state which taxes utility property. And
management, looking for a site, is likely to be more favorably inclined toward a
state where the development agency is well-informed and aggressive in atomic
energy matters than toward a state where the government is indifferent or ignorant
of the unique needs, interests, and problems of the atomic entrepreneur. Variations
from state to state in tax structure, labor markets, and treatment of foreign corporations will all be weighed, along with numerous other factors, many of which will
be unique for the organization making the decision, such as proximity to a university or a market, or physical integration with other components of the company's
plants. In this complex, the attitudes of state governors, legislators, regulatory commissions, municipalities, and the responsible public opinion to which they must react
and which they, in turn, can shape, are, in part, the determinants of that intangible
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but significant "climate" of the state which can affect profoundly the speed and
direction of its atomic growth.
To a certain extent, the states can participate directly in the development of atomic
industry. In those states where power companies are run by municipalities or
other governmental subdivisions, positive governmental leadership can pioneer the
way, with the state treasury providing financial assistance in the interest of development for the benefit of all of its citizens. It is not inconceivable that a state might
authorize construction of a power reactor in its own right as a means of meeting
the high developmental costs of power reactors today, with an eye to distribution of
the power produced and dissemination of the lessons in reactor technology learned
to the existing power companies in its territory on some equitable basis. At the
educational level, state universities can be supplied with research reactors, and research in problems of special interest to the state can be encouraged 8 While the
"climate" of the state, as assessed by a private organization weighing the comparative advantages of two or more states, is not something wholly under the control
of the state government, there are areas in which the state government can take
direct action.
The Change in Kind and Pace of Development.
The third new condition mentioned as having a profound impact upon state
responsibilities is the change in the kind and pace of atomic energy development.
By change "in kind," reference is made to the trend to private financing. It has been
noted above that privately financed organizations will be the object of state regulatory
and developmental activity. Private financing has further implications, however. In
addition to creating private atomic activity to be developed and controlled, privately
financed organizations will also create new private activity collateral to the atomic
activity, which will engage further state action.
For example, the utility company proposing to operate a power reactor will have
to have insurance. Clearly, the state and its municipalities have an interest in the
type and extent of insurance coverage available for potential radiation hazards.
What must be done to make available workmen's compensation insurance covering
personnel at atomic energy plants on a realistic basis? What are the proper rates
for fire and explosion insurance for a given type of reactor when no experience tables
are available? Is state action the appropriate way to solve the problem raised by
the need for public liability insurance in excess of the underwriting capacity of the
private insurance industry? To what extent can a private utility company be permitted to be self-insured? Are present statutes of limitations of claims for injury
arising out of radiation exposure realistic? State insurance commissions and other
'North Carolina, for example, has had a nuclear reactor in operation since 1953 at the North Carolina State College, where a program in nuclear engineering has been established and where, in July
x955, a special one-month course in Industrial Participation in Nuclear Power Developments was offered.
On May 27, 1955, Florida, following suit, adopted a statute appropriating $5oo,ooo to the University
of Florida to engage in atomic research and acquire a reactor. Fla. Bill No. 304, Laws of 1955.
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authorities clearly have a role to play in the effort to meet the pressing needs of the
privately financed atomic energy industry for insurance of all kinds.9
Growing atomic enterprises will undoubtedly search for capital. Already, there
has been considerable agitation for stricter controls over the issuance of securities by
uranium mining corporations. What should be the policy of the states with respect
to concerns whose key valuable asset is a revocable license to use government-owned
special nuclear material, or to concerns having commercial activities all of which are
still considered classified information? State "Blue Sky" commissions will have
some part to play in this connection in atomic industrial development.
A fairly long-term demand for uranium appears to be a feature of mid-twentieth
century life. An unprecedented uranium hunt, sparked by pegged federal prices
for ore and bonus awards for new discoveries, has sent thousands of professionals
and amateurs into the field. States in which such activity is under way may well
have to face the question of whether their mining laws are adequate for the needs
of the time.'0
Experimentation in the processing of foods by use of ionizing radiation instead
of heat is well under way today. When techniques become perfected, state agriculture and food and drug authorities will have new problems to face. While the
AEC may have exclusive control of the processing operation from a health and safety
point of view, there is a substantial question whether its authority or the scope of
its effective administration extends to the channels of trade between wholesaler and
corner grocery, once the food has left the processing plant.
As the number of industrial and other applications of atomic energy increases,
there will be an increasing demand for new kinds of specially trained personnel.
Experts, such as "health physicists," may be required to inspect or supervise certain
operations. State civil service commissions and boards of professional registration
will undoubtedly have to adjust their categories and establish new standards to
accommodate the new species of atomic-age professionals.
As privately owned reactors come into operation, private institutions will gradually take over an increasing share of the business of producing radioactive isotopes.
State highway, airway, and waterway authorities may have to exercise control over
shipments of radioactive materials within the state over which the federal authorities
exercise no jurisdiction.
Charitable institutions, such as hospitals, universities, and research foundations,
utilize isotopes and are beginning to apply for licenses to build and operate reactors."
In many, if not a majority, of the states, such organizations enjoy some degree of
' See Preliminary Report of the Insurance Study Group to the Atomic Energy Commission, AEC
Release No. 662, July 13, 1955.
'oIn Texas, such an evaluation has been made by a subcommittee of the Mineral Law Section of the
State Bar of Texas, entitled MINERAL LAws oF TE STATE OF TEXAS IN RELATION To FISSIONABLE MATERUALS (1955).
'Five of nine applications ,eceived by the AEC from private parties in the first six months of 5955
for licenses to construct atomic energy facilities were submitted by charitable institutions. See AEC
EIGTEENTH SEMIA,.NUAL REP. 103 (1955).
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immunity from tort claims. In the light of the potential hazards involved in utilization of atomic energy, such legal immunity would appear to deserve careful reexamination by the state legislatures.
State civil defense authorities will be likely to have a great interest in the number
of atomic energy installations in the state, the degree to which the state is sophisticated in the uses of atomic energy and the practices necessary for radiation hazard
control, the availability of trained personnel and adequate radiation detection equipment, and the general level of understanding of radiation hazards at the command
of the populace. Defense officials may well command political, if not legal, forces
which will affect atomic energy development in any given area.
Private groups are already in competition with one another in the atomic business, with respect to both large projects, such as building power reactors, and small
items, such as manufacturing radiation detection equipment. Competition inevitably
leads to cost-consciousness, which, in turn, tends to induce competitors to economize
by reducing expensive safety practices to minimum standards. Thus, complacency
on the part of the states, whether reasoned or unreasoned, has become entirely
inadequate today.
Although not a matter to be developed here, it should be pointed out that these
collateral activities, which will inevitably occur with the private development of
atomic energy and will prompt the types of state action noted above, will also invoke
collateral federal activities by agencies other than the AEC. Regulations concerning
the shipment of radioactive materials by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Post Office Department are obvious examples.' 3
Licensees who transmit or sell electric energy in interstate commerce are expressly
made subject to the regulatory provisions of the Federal Power Act under section
272 of the Atomic Energy Act of I954.4 And it may be expected that other federal
agencies will come to have a tangential part to play in the development and regulation of the industry.
What has been said about changed conditions of all kinds makes it evident that
the state authorities have a significant role to play in the peacetime development of
atomic energy. The accelerating pace of atomic development' 5 underscores the
"2See Immunity of Nongovernmental Charity from Liability for Damages in Tort, Annot., 25
A.L.R. 2d 29 (1952).
1249 C.F.R. § 71-78 (Supp.

I954); 14 C.F.R. § 49 (1952); 39 C.F.R. § 35.x6a (1949).

Less

obvious examples are Coast Guard Regulations, 46 C.F.R. § 146 (i953); and Labor Department Child
Labor Regulations. 29 C.F.R. § 4.57 (Supp. 2954).
" 68 STAT. 960, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2o9 (Supp. 1954).

" In the first six months of 1955, the AEC received nine applications for licenses to construct atomic
energy facilities and three to use special nuclear materials for other purposes. See AEC EIGHTEENTH
SEMIANNUAL REP. 103-04 (955). The uses of radioactive isotopes are also steadily increasing: between
August 2, 1946, and December 31, 1953, x2,162 curies of radioactive isotopes were distributed, see AEC
SEVENTEENTH SEMIANNUAL REP. 93 (1955); between January i and November 30, 1954, I4,698 curies
were distributed, ibid.; and in the first five months of 1955, 17,730 curies were distributed. See AEC
EIGHTEENTH SEMIANNUAL Rp. 12X (1955).
Further, according to the Survey of Materials, Equip-

ment and Personnel for Atomic Energy Development, published by the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.,
in April 1955, industry and other private organizations can be expected to spend $300-500 million of
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immediacy with which many of these new problems must be dealt if a state is to
experience an orderly, effective development and regulation of atomic energy within
its borders instead of a disorderly patchwork of stop-gap measures and countermeasures, designed to meet specific problems here and there, without thorough
comprehension of the total needs of the situation.
II
The basic question confronting a state, as a result of the passage of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, is the proper delineation of the area over which the state now
has power and responsibility for governmental action. Under our system of government, in which the national government is granted specified powers only but is
supreme within its proper sphere of action, the entire residue of governmental powers
and responsibilities inheres in the state governments, subject to certain constitutional
limitations. Hence, the question invokes a twofold analysis: a determination of the
type and scope of powers over atomic energy development vested in the national
government by the Constitution; and a determination whether Congress, in passing
the 1954 act, exercised its constitutional powers partially, fully, or exceeded them.
The constitutional basis upon which the act rests are several: Two great, sweeping
powers of the national government which Congress utilized are the war power and
the commerce power; lesser powers are the power to dispose of government property,
the power to grant patents, the power to make arrangements with foreign nations,
and probably others, including the power to provide for the general welfare, if that
be a separate power.' 6
Because the 1954 act rests on several constitutional bases and is directed toward
a number of specific ends, from the development of military potential to the granting
of operator's licenses and the sale of electric power, it is not fruitful to speculate
about the constitutional power of the national government in this area in general.
Different parts of the statute will rest upon different configurations of constitutional
powers. In fact, the Supreme Court, the final arbiter of questions concerning the
extent of national and state powers under the Constitution, under its rule of entertaining only questions necessary to the solution of actual cases and controversies,
can be expected to adjudicate specific disputes by determining, first, what part the
1954 act plays in the solution of each and, next, whether the provision of the act
relied upon was within the constitutional competence of Congress. And since section 281 of the act'" contains a separability clause, even if the Supreme Court should
invalidate part of the act as exceeding the proper ambit of congressional power, other
unrelated sections of the act would be unaffected thereby.
nongovernmental funds on nuclear research and development during the five-year period 1954-58, inclusive. Moreover, government expenditures over the same period are likely to be several times this
figure, exclusive of the weapons program, and are bound to produce technological advances capable of
supporting industrial development on a constantly broadening basis. See id. at 8.
"eSee §§ 2 and 3 of the 1954 act, 68 STAT. 921, 923, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2012, 2013 (Supp. 1954),
which set forth the congressional findings and the purpose of the act.
"' 68 STAT. 960, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2o1 note (Supp. 1954).
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s
Assuming, however, that no part of the 1954 act will be held unconstitutional'
(an assumption which seems to be perfectly safe 9 ), there will still arise the following questions with respect to any given portion of the pattern of control:

Did Congress intend to pre-empt certain areas of atomic energy regulation
from which the states are to be precluded?
If Congress so intended, what are the limits of the pre-empted areas?
If Congress so intended, is the pre-emption effective immediately or only
after the AEC has affirmatively acted to implement congressional intent?
If Congress so intended, may the states regulate matters within the preempted areas if the AEC declines to regulate such matters, either expressly
or by silence?
If Congress so intended, may the states adopt rules consistent or identical
with the federal regulation?
These are questions of statutory construction.20 The 1954 act contains no clear
expression of congressional intent on these matters with respect to peacetime development of atomic energy. Accordingly, to determine such questions, the courts
may be expected to look to a number of other criteria in addition to the language
of the act itself, namely: legislative history of the act; 2 whether the AEC has been
given statutory directives or only authority; 22 policy considerations of uniformity
23
versus diversity of regulation, and of centralized versus localized administration;
2
the extent to which an over-all scheme of federal regulation has been established; 1
the consequences of alternative possibilities; 2 5 and perhaps others.
As with the questions of constitutional power, the foregoing questions must be
examined with respect to each area of proposed state action, rather than with respect
to state action in general. Prior to final determination of such questions, by
unambiguous expression of congressional intent or by definitive court decision, therefore, it is necessary to proceed with a painstaking analysis of the relevant factors
involved in each proposed state action and apply the several criteria noted above in
order to reach sound conclusions as to its proper scope.
"s See, in this connection, Estep, Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime Private
Atomic Energy Activities, 52 MicH. L. Rav. 333 (1954), for a detailed discussion of the extent of congressional power to regulate a field which has traditionally been considered within the police powers

of the states.
"This is not to say that the application of the statute may not, under some circumstances, be held
to be unconstitutional, but only that it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will hold any part of the
1954 act to be invalid, per se, as violative of the Constitution.
o"In most instances in the atomic energy field, it should be noted, we are not confronted with the
problem of the scope of a state's power to act in the absence of congressional action. Cf. Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 19 U.S. (X2 How.) 299 (185).
" Cf. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U.S. z52 (1946).
"Cf. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Navigation Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926). But see H. P.

Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 3o6 U.S. 79 (939).
" Cf. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corporation, 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
"Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148
(1942).
2'Cf. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, supra note 21.
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III
It is apparent that the first task of state authorities is to institute an orderly and
thorough examination of the relationship of the changes described above upon each
existing area of state function and to appraise imaginatively the need for state activity
of types and in areas not now foreseen. Then, policies should be developed and
mechanisms created to coordinate interstate and regional interests, and ways should
be found to integrate those interests with the national atomic energy program.
To date, the state initiative with respect to atomic energy matters has been exercised in one of two general ways. Several states, which as of August x955 included
the New England states, Texas, Michigan, and Illinois, have been impressed with
the need for study of the over-all problem of integrating state and national atomic
energy programs and have launched special studies to provide the background for
a coordinated, over-all approach to its solution. Other states, such as New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, California, North Carolina, Florida, and others, have
been impressed with the need for specialized state action in one or more specific
areas-for the most part, that of health and safety regulations-and have acted
accordingly. 6 It will be useful to explore in some detail the problems which confront state authorities under both approaches.
That there would be an impact upon the states generally as a result of the atomic
revolution now in progress was apparently first recognized in New England. In
December 1953, a bill was introduced into the Massachusetts legislature to establish
an atomic energy commission at the state level.2 7 Its principal objective was to focus
the attention of the state government upon the manifold opportunities and responsibilities that would arise in the event that amendments to the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946, which were then under discussion in Congress, should become law. The
bill was not enacted.
In February 1954, however, the New England Governors' Conference appointed
a committee of twelve distinguished New England citizens to be a New England
Committee on Atomic Energy,28 whose duty it was to study and report on both the
area's potentialities for atomic energy development and the opportunities and responsibilities of the state governments, industries, educational institutions, and citizens which should be anticipated. In both its interim report in December 1954 and
its final report in July 1955, this Committee strongly recommended the enactment
29
of a state atomic energy law during the 1955 sessions of the state legislatures.
The form of model state law proposed, together with the comments included in the
report, is fully set forth in Appendix I.
The first objective of the model act, set forth in sections i (a) and 2, is to estab" Mineral laws and developmental activities appear to be the next most popular areas for state action.

"Mass. H. Bill No. 851 (1953).
" Members of the Committee were: Karl T. Compton, Chairman (deceased); Hartley Rowe, Succeeding Chairman; Ralph D. Booth; Wallace Fay; Leslie R. Groves; Robert N. Haskell; Frank D.
Merrill; Sumner Pike; Arthur L. Quirk; 0. P. Robinson, Jr.; Shields Warren; and William Webster.
" See NEw ENGLAND COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, AToauic ENERGY AND NEW ENGLAND 59 (1955).
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lish in the state a single, harmonious pattern of atomic energy regulation, under the
aegis of either federal or state law. Section 2 contains substantive provisions designed
both to insure automatic coordination of federal and state regulation and to eliminate the possibility of a jurisdictional no-man's land. It appears to be beyond
question that this objective is highly desirable. Effective formulation of this objective in writing, however, presents difficult drafting problems. 0
The second objective of the model act, set forth in sections i(b) and 3, is to
initiate an orderly, comprehensive review of state functions and responsibilities that
may be affected by atomic energy development, by specifically requiring each major
administrative unit of the state government to make such a review of its functions
and to present appropriate recommendations on the subject to the governor. The
importance of this type of action has already been noted, but it should further be
observed that such an undertaking is no mean task. An adequate survey may well
require the employment of persons possessing knowledge about atomic energy who
are not ordinarily at the command of the administrative units making the studies.
If fruitful results are to be achieved, not only must the appropriate agencies be given
the responsibility for making such studies, but the agencies must be provided with
enough money to insure that the studies are carried through, and the responsible
official in each agency must be sufficiently apprised of the importance of the program
so that it will be carried through without undue delay.
The third objective of the model act, set forth in section 4, is to provide a focus
for the development of state policy in atomic energy matters by creating, on the staff
of the governor, the office of Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities. The
coordinator is to serve as adviser to the governor with respect to atomic industrial
development within the state and as deputy of the governor in matters relating to
atomic energy. He is given the duty of coordinating the studies, recommendations,
and proposals of the departments of the state government and its subdivisions, and
of providing liaison between his state, its sister states, and the AEC on atomic
energy matters.
The Committee's comment concerning the creation of this office is worth repeating here for emphasis:
This section is premised on the proposition that what is everybody's business is nobody's
business and therefore seeks to make sure that atomic development and regulation is
somebody's business. The office of the Coordinator .

.

. is proposed so that at least one

person in a central position in the State Government will be responsible for seeing that

the way is cleared for atomic development and that this is done without jeopardizing the

public interest.
To this comment, it should be added that the success of such a scheme will turn,
in large measure, upon the calibre of person selected for the position of coordinator
and the financial resources placed at his disposal. Upon his shoulders, primarily,
will lie the responsibility for the "climate" of the state in atomic energy matters.
" See id. at 63.
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Probably a considerable part of his efforts will be directed along "public relations"
lines, requiring him both to display initiative, imagination, and diplomacy and to
do a great deal of assembling and disseminating of information pertinent to the
field. There is a danger that the potential benefits to be achieved through the
coordinator will be lost if the person selected is already loaded with business or

governmental responsibilities and if he is given neither office nor staff nor salary
commensurate with his position 3 1 Even in states where the prospects for the use
of atomic energy for power generation seem quite remote, there is bound to be
a number of industrial or agricultural establishments which can benefit from utilization of new processes or techniques involving radioactive isotopes.

On this point,

one may well heed the recent advice of Sumner Pike, former AEC Commissioner :82
The writer has had the experience of being fairly close to the subject [of atomic energy],
since he was appointed to the original federal Atomic Energy Commission in 1946. About
the only dependable lesson he has drawn from the experience is that the subject won't
stay hitched, predictions are frequently obsolete before they get into print, and that
constant vigilance, combined with flexibility, seems to be the only policy which pays off.
The achievement of constant vigilance combined with flexibility of approach in a

constantly shifting, developing industrial field requires the full time services of high
calibre personnel-not a paper assignment of responsibilities to a figurehead.
As of August 1955, the report of the New England Committee was the most
comprehensive study published on the implications of atomic energy for the states.
The Texas Legislative Council published a somewhat similar report in May 1955 on
the implications of atomic energy development for Texas and included the New
England Committee's draft of a model statute as an appendix to its report without
endorsing or criticizing it 3 A special committee appointed in Michigan by Governor Williams to study the problem for that state submitted a terse report in the
spring of 1955, stating that state legislation in the field was premature8 The Illinois
legislature in 1955 authorized the creation of an Atomic Energy Study Commission, "
but, to date, this group has not had time to complete its work. Without legislative
direction, the Governor of Texas appointed a special advisory committee on atomic
energy in September 1955, and the Governor of New York appointed an Atomic
Energy Council in November 1955.
Legislative response to the model statute proposed by the New England Com-

mittee has been favorable. Maine adopted a statute on March 18, 1955, closely patterned after the model law;"6 and New HampshireI and Connecticut38 did likewise
a' So far, the New England states have not provided substantial financial support for their atomic
energy programs. See notes 36, 37, 38, and 39 infra.
2Pike, supra note 7, at 673.
aa See

STAFF RESEARCH REPORT TO THE TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, IMPLICATIONS OF ATOMIO ENERGY

(955).
A supplement to this report was issued in November 1955.
"See MICIGAN ATOMIC ENERGY STUDy COMMITTEE, REPORT TO GOVERNOR WILLIAMS (1955).
"Ill. S. Bill No. 577, Laws of 1955.
"Me. Acts, 1955 c. 105. The coordinator is given no salary, and no money is appropriated for
his use in performing his statutory duties.
"N. H. Acts, 1955, C. 281. The position of coordinator is to be conferred on the head of one of
FOR TEXAS
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on August i and August ii, respectively. Rhode Island, ahead of the other New
England states, passed a state atomic energy law in January x955, not based upon
the model statute, but containing provision for a five-man state atomic energy commission, with duties similar to those given to the coordinator under the model
statute 0 No action has been taken in Vermont. And the model statute was not
introduced in the 1955 session of the Massachusetts legislature; instead, it passed
only a statute relative to radiological safety 4° and a resolve concerning study of location of "atomic plants" in Massachusetts 1
A discussion of state planning to accommodate its pre-existing policies and laws
to the atomic age would be incomplete without mention of the points of contact
which each state will have with the federal government. The AEC is not unaware
of the problem of interleaving its policies with those of the states with respect to
peaceful applications of atomic energy. In July 1955, it invited representatives of
the governors of the forty-eight states to Washington to discuss the problems of state
and federal cooperation:'- Particular emphasis was placed upon the health and
42
safety regulations which the AEC had then just published in the FederalRegister.
The meeting served as a good introductory session for the officials of the state and
federal governments who will have to work together with these matters in the
future. In the federal government, the primary contact point for the states is the
Division of Civilian Application of the AEC, which superseded both the Licensing
Division and the Industrial Liaison Branch of the Reactor Development Division.
A secondary point of contact is the Inspection Division. A third is the Isotopes
Division, which still maintains its own offices for processing applications for isotopes
and its own inspection staff. For smooth working relations between nation and
state and for most efficient development of the industry, it is important that the
responsibility in the AEC for coordinating federal policy development with that
of the states and for providing liaison between the AEC and the states be focused
in one division of the agency. It is just as true with the national government as it
is with the states that "what is everybody's business is nobody's business."
At present, the Division of Civilian Application is the primary office to which
a state coordinator, or like official, should turn to attack the problems of federalstate adjustment. However, the responsibility for providing a qualified state official
the existing state departments and is to be unpaid. One thousand dollars is appropriated for secretarial
and similar expenses.
"' Conn. Pub. Acts, June Spec. Sess., 1955, No. 46. The coordinator is paid twenty dollars a day
while actually performing his functions as such, but otherwise is given no salary. Five thousand dollars
is appropriated to carry out the purposes of the act.
"R. I. PuB. LAws, 1955, c. 3416. The commissioners are to be unpaid. Five thousand dollars
is appropriated for expenses for the first fifteen months. The commission is responsible for conducting
studies, but no provision is made for coordinating federal and state jurisdiction over atomic energy

activities.
40 Mass. Acts and Resolves, 1955, c. 335.

"Id., c. 88.
'4 The AEC has made available a record of this meeting, entitled, Conference of State Representatives
on the AEC Licensing Program, July z 3 and 14, 1955, Summary of Proceedings.
42 2o FED. REG. 5101 (1955), amending io CFR Part 20.
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to deal with those problems and to meet the AEC half-way remains with the states.
Coordination cannot be achieved through federal action alone.

IV
The creation of a state coordinator or a state atomic energy commission is but
a first step toward development of sound state policies for atomic energy. Such a
step will not solve the many problems of adjustment noted above; it will only provide an agency responsible for their systematic solution. The problems remain to
be worked out, one by one, with due consideration for the unique elements in each.
State regulation for the protection of health and safety against the hazards of ionizing radiation is one major problem which is already being actively considered both
by the federal government and by a number of states. We have, therefore, selected
it for more extended treatment, as an example of the role states will play in atomic
energy development.
From the initial mining of uranium ore to the final dispersal or decay of radioactive materials, by-products, and isotopes produced from it, certain risks of radiation exposure are present to the health and safety of both the workmen engaged in
the industry and also, often, the general public at large. A workman in a uranium
mine may, over a period of time, become ill from excessive inhalation of radon
gas.. Persons working in plants where uranium ore is processed, where U-235 is
separated from U-238, where fuel elements for reactors are fabricated, or where
reactors convert fissionable material into power all run a risk of accidental exposure
to excessive radiation, either by direct radiation or by the uncontrolled escape of
radioactive particles. The risks to the general public are highest in connection with
the operation of the chemical separation plants and reactors and with the disposal
of radioactive waste products. The largest present source of hazard from private
atomic energy activity probably results from the widespread use of radioactive isotopes in industry and in medical research and therapy.
Regulation to insure adequate protection against the potential hazards of ionizing
radiation is complicated because of several factors: radiation cannot be detected by
human senses, but requires specialized equipment to be located and measured;
exposure has a cumulative effect upon the human organism; different types of radioactive substances produce different types and intensities of radiation and have different rates of decay; different types of radiation affect the human body differently;
each type of radiation is more hazardous to certain parts and organs of the human
body than to the rest of it; deleterious effects of excessive exposure may not become
evident in the human organism until long after exposure takes place; and the deleterious consequences may extend to future generations because of the effect of radiation upon genetic processes. Each of these factors tends to make the experts in the field
conservative; consequently, adopted standards are likely to contain a large margin
for error. In addition, the scientific community is constantly gaining additional
experience in matters of radiation protection; the generally recognized standards of
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safe practices to minimize radiation hazards are under constant re-evaluation, and,
from time to time, they change.
One unique aspect of this problem is that it has existed for some time and has
already been the subject of considerable attention. While information about the
hazards of radiation has never been common knowledge, those of the scientific
and medical professions who work with radiation have been aware of the hazards
of ionizing radiation at least since the i92o's. In the United States, in 1929, there
was established an Advisory Committee on X-Ray and Radium Protection, sponsored
by the National Bureau of Standards. Its members were drawn from professional
and commercial associations interested in the use of radioactive substances, primarily
radium, and in the production of radiation by other means. Prior to World War II,
this Committee had produced handbooks setting forth procedures for protection
against specific hazards then encountered. Today the Committee is called the
National Committee on Radiation Protection and is composed of experts in the field
of radiation protection from the American College of Radiology, American Medical
Association, American Radium Society, American Roentgen Ray Society, National
Bureau of Standards, National Electrical Manufacturers Association, Radiological
Society of North America, the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Atomic
Energy Commission, and Public Health Service, and certain representatives at large.43
Since 1946, it has revised all of the earlier handbooks and produced a number of
new ones. 44
In the field of radiation protection, therefore, there exists a nationally recognized
body of authority and cadre of established experts to guide the formulation of an
effective code. The NCRP, itself, is a voluntary organization with no regulatory
or control authority over anyone. It considers its main purpose to be the establishment of the basic principles and philosophy of radiation protection; and it volunteers to assist any group faced with the problem of establishing practices to reduce
radiation hazards. Recently, the NCRP has extended its work beyond the field of
establishment of basic principles. Under pressure from state officials who desire
state regulation of radiation hazards, it is in the process of publishing a handbook,
entitled The Regulation of Radiation Exposure by Legislative Means, which will

contain not only the Committee's conclusions as to basic principles, but also suggested forms for a State Radiation Protection Act and for regulations under it.
"aSee Taylor, State Control of Protection Against Ionizing Radiation, 71 AM. J. ROENTGEN. 691,
698-99 (0954).
"The currently effective handbooks are: H 41, MEDICAL X-RAY PROTECTION UP TO Two MILLION
VOLTS (1949); H 42, SAFE HANDLING OF RADIOACTIVE ISOTOPES (1949); H 48, CONTROL AND REMOVAL
OF RADIOACTIVE

CONTAMINATION

IN

(i95i); H 49, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WASTE
FOR MEDICAL USERS (1951); H 51, RADIOLOGICAL MONIH 52, MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE AMOUNTS OF RADIOISOTOPES

LABORATORIES

DISPOSAL OF PHOsPHORus-32 AND IODINE-I31
TORING METHODS AND INSTRUMENTS (952);

THE HUMAN BODY AND MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR AND WATER (1953); H 53,
H 54, PROTECTION AGAINST RADIADISPOSAL OF CAON-I4 WASTES (953);
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR T
TIONS FROM RADIUM, COBALT-6O, AND CSIUI-37 (1954); H 55, PERSONNEL PROTECTION FOR BETATRONIN

SYNCHROTRON RADIATIONS

UP TO

100 MILLION

ELECTRON VOLTS

(1954);

H 56,

SAFE HANDLING

OF

CADAVERS CONTAINING RADIOACTIVE ISOTOPES (1953); H 58, RADIOACTIVE-WASTE DISPOSAL IN THE OCEAN
See Taylor,
(1954); H 59, PERMISSIBLE DOSE FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES OF IONIZING RADIATION (1954).

supra note 43; at 701.
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Before studying the role of the states in this field, however, one must take into
account existing federal action. Working closely with the NCRP on the formulation
of substantive provisions, the AEC published its proposed regulation on Standards
for Protection against Radiation in the Federal Register in July i955.

General

authority for the promulgation of such a regulation is found in section 16x(b) of
the 1954 act,46 which empowers the AEC to:
*

.

.establish by rule, regulation, or order, such standards and instructions to govern the

possession and use of special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material
as the Commission may deem necessary or desirable to promote the common defense and
security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property... ;
as well as in specific provisions to similar effect dealing with arrangements to assist
research,47 production of special nuclear material, 48 the distribution of special nuclear
material, the distribution of source material, ° the distribution 52of by-product material,5 1 and the licensing of utilization and production facilities.
The regulation contains three key substantive sections. The basic section, entitled
Permissible Doses and Concentrations, specifies maximum permissible doses of radiation to which individuals in controlled areas may be exposed and maximum concentrations of radioactive material which may be permitted to be created in uncontrolled
areas, to remain on exposed surfaces, or to be disposed of into air or water beyond
the effective control of the licensee. The other two substantive sections, dealing with
Hazard Control and Waste Disposal, contain certain required means (some specific,
some general) to be followed in attaining the ends set forth in the preceding sectioq.
The section entitled Hazard Control requires, in general, that certain personnel
likely to receive specified high doses of radiation or airborne radioactive material be

required to use personnel monitoring equipment or respiratory protective equipment;
that radiation areas and containers in which radioactive material is stored or transferred be posted with certain caution symbols and signs; that licensed material in
noncontrolled areas be stored in locked and secured containers; and that individuals
working with or in proximity to licensed material be instructed in the safe handling
of such material, in the use of monitoring equipment and safety devices, and in
emergency procedures. The third basic section of the regulation, entitled Waste
Disposal, sets forth criteria to be observed in disposal of radioactive material into
the ground, the ocean, and public sewers. The regulations are flexible, in that the
AEC may grant to any licensee such exemptions from the requirements of the
regulation as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or
"See

"68

note 42 supra.
STAT. 948, 42 U.S.C.A. § 22oi(b) (Supp. 1954).

"§ 31(c),

68

STAT. 927, 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 2051(c) (Supp. 1954).

§ 4 5(b), (c), 68 STAT. 928, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2o6(b), (c) (Supp. 1954).
§ 53(e)(7), 68 STAT. 930, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2073(e)(7) (Supp. 1954).
=o§ 63(b), 68 SAT. 933, 42 U.S.C.A. §209 3 (b) (Supp. 1954).
"§ 8r, 68 STAT. 935, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2II (Supp. 1954).
59§ 1o3(b), (d), 104(a), (b), (c), (d), 68 STAT. 936, 937, 42 U.S.C.A. §§21 3 3(b), (d), 2134(a),

(b), (c), (d) (Supp. 1954).
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property, and reserves the right to impose upon any licensee such additional requirements as it deems appropriate to protect health or minimize danger to life or
property.
Two basic and quite different questions confront a state with respect to health
and safety regulation for protection against potential radiation hazards: What action,
if any, can a state legally take, in view of the above federal regulations? And what
action, if any, should a given state take under the circumstances?
The first question raises legal issues which have been alluded to generally above.
It is the opinion of the writers that to the extent that federal control over regulation
for protection against radiation hazards has been asserted in the 1954 act, Congress
intended that it be exclusive. 2 The following factors seem to compel this conclusion:
(i) Under the 1946 act, the national government clearly exercised exclusive control in this area. Modification of such a regime would, accordingly, seem to require
explicit language to that effect. But there is no such language in the 1954 act;
instead, extensive instructions are given to the AEC in this regard, and any possible
role for the states is completely ignored.
(2) Radiation hazards, especially those arising out of operation of power reactors,
are not local in nature, but can cause danger to multistate areas.
(3)Uniformity of regulation in this field is highly desirable.
(4)There is a relatively small number of persons in this country competent to
assess potential radiation risks; and, as of the effective date of the 1954 act, the AEC
had most of these persons at its command.
Thus, state regulation in this area which conflicts with the federal regulation would
appear to be superseded thereby. 3 And, although no close analogies appear to be
invocable, it seems clear that the Supreme Court would hold the 1954 act, so construed, to be a valid exercise of war and commerce powers, and not unconstitutional. 4
In this situation, three clear-cut, rational, general courses can be followed by any
state considering the problem of protecting its citizens from potential radiation
hazards. The first is to do nothing, relying upon the protection afforded by the AEC
regulations and practices. The second is to adopt laws and regulations to protect
the state's citizens from potential radiation hazards not regulated by the AEC-to
"take up the slack" in the federal program, to use a popular phrase. The third is to
adopt laws and comprehensive regulations overlapping all federal control and also
regulating the areas not touched by the federal authorities.
2

- To date, the AEC has declined to adopt an official position on this question. See remarks prepared by Harold L. Price, Director, Division of Civilian Application, AEC, for presentation before the
Atomic Industrial Forum, Sept. 27, X955.
"' It can be argued on the other hand, however, that Congress must explicidy provide that states'
law will be superseded in order to pre-empt a field traditionally considered to be within the domain of
state police powers-and the 1954 act contains no such language.
" See Estep, supra note i8.
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"Doing nothing" may sound like an abdication of responsibility. It is not, however, or at least need not necessarily be so. The atomic energy industry is a new
one. Concepts of standards of protection against radiation hazards have undergone
many changes in recent years, and it is the opinion of experts in the field that as
more experience is gained such standards will be continually re-examined and
modified. 5 A state having no or few sources of potential radiation hazards outside
the scope of federal regulation or having an insufficient number of adequately
trained experts in the field of radiation safety upon whom it could call to administer
any program might wisely choose not to embark on any special scheme of state regulation at this time. Other factors which a state might take into consideration in
determining whether regulations of any sort are desirable are: whether the private
organizations to be regulated are responsible or not; whether they have already established and are enforcing adequate control measures in their own establishments; the
value to be gained by a cautious policy of waiting and seeing how the programs of
other states fare; and finally, of course, whether there is political pressure from
constituents for regulation.
A second possible state policy would be to adopt measures to protect the state's
citizens from hazards with which the AEC is not concerned. Is there, in fact, an
area left untouched by federal controls? The answer is clearly "yes." Neither the
act nor the regulations purport to deal with naturally occurring radioactive substances
other than source materials, such as radium and radon and their daughter products;
nor with radiation produced from X-ray machines, fluoroscopic devices, and particle
accelerators; nor with radioactive isotopes produced by particle accelerators and not
distributed by the AEC. Nor does the AEC concern itself with health hazards
connected with source materials prior to their delivery to the government or its
agents for refining. These areas, then, constitute sources of potential hazard to the
citizens-of the states which may well deserve attention. In addition, although
radioactive isotopes are made available to private users by the AEC only pursuant
to licenses granted by the Isotopes Division, follow-up inspections of the users of
such isotopes are made only on a spot-check basis, with priority given to the licensees
who possess a large quantity of a particular isotope or who possess a particularly
dangerous one. This type of inspection is used because of the large number of
isotope shipments currently being made and because such inspection system has
operated satisfactorily to date 6 While it is illegal to transfer or acquire AECproduced isotopes without license from the AEC, the spot-check type of inspection
cannot insure that the isotopes do not pass into the possession of unlicensed persons
who are not complying with the safety precautions required by the AEC. The
considerations mentioned above as appropriate determinants of state action or inaction would also be applicable in this limited field of regulation.
The third possible course which a state might follow would be to adopt com" See generally NCRP, THE REGULATiON
published in December 1955).

OF RADIATION ExPosTRE BY LEGISLATIVE MEANS

"' See Aebersold, Address to Meeting of States' Representatives, op. cit. supra note 41 a, at 18.

(to
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prehensive radiation protection regulations overlapping the AEC regulations, with
or without coverage of the additional area mentioned above. Such action would
be based on the theory that although the national government's laws and regulations
are to be accorded a pre-eminent status over state laws and regulations, the latter
are not invalid so long as they are not inconsistent with the federal program. Some
legal authority for such theory could be found in the fairly recent case of California
v. Zook.17 It would seeem, however, that such coincidental regulation has little to
commend it. To the extent the area is covered by federal regulation, such state
action is probably useless duplication. In addition, the legal status of such action is
equivocal. Prior to the Zook case, the rule had been well established that such
coincident state regulation was as ineffective as conflicting state regulation; 5 and
the Zook case, a 5-4 decision, has never been relied upon by the Supreme Court
since it was decided. Thus, it would appear to be a poor basis on which to erect
a structure of state regulation in this field.
From the foregoing, it appears that the states in adopting their own health and
safety regulations, would probably be best advised to limit themselves to dealing
with radiation hazards outside the scope of the federal law and regulations.59 Even
in this limited area, the states should take care to impose regulations not for their
own sake but only for the sake of controlling hazards that actually exist; and even
then, only when sufficient numbers of adequately trained personnel are available to
prepare and enforce them. Overzealousness may not only be fruitless, but may, in
some cases, be harmful. If, for instance, the only particle accelerator in the state is
located in a large university and operated only by a competent staff, enforced compliance with detailed, overconservative health and safety regulations might well
cost more in terms of lost research effort than it would provide in terms of safeguards. Types of state control over radiation protection that are already being
asserted are shown in Appendix II.
Adoption of the policy of self-restraint here recommended, however, need not
deny the states a significant role in controlling radiation hazards within the perimeter
of AEC responsibility. The states, however, must be willing to act in the capacity
of agents of the national government rather than as sovereign principals. All of the
states have one or more agencies charged with responsibility for state public health
and industrial health and safety. Such organizations regularly check the state's
water for impurities, its air for pollution, its industrial establishments for railings,
lights, sanitary facilities, and so forth. To the extent that AEC inspectors make the
same rounds while checking on uses of isotopes, or investigating concerns producing
or utilizing special nuclear material, or disposing of waste materials, unnecessary
07336

U.S. 725 (i949)-

"s Southern Ry. v. Indiana, 236 U.S. 439 (1915); Charlestown & Western Carolina R.R. v. Varnville
Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915).

"This policy appears to be consistent with the general position being taken by the NCRP in its forthcoming handbook, The Regulation of Radiation Exposure by Legislative Means, supra note 55. The
NCRP, however, seems to entertain doubts (not shared by the writers) as to the power of the federal
government to exclude the states from activity in the area federally regulated.
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duplication of effort is involved. The AEC radiation control program, thus, might
well be made more efficient and its limits of effective administration extended if
the AEC inspections were made by the appropriate state agency whose officials
already customarily monitor the locus in question. Such a procedure would be
feasible only in states where the state health department or labor department or
both have at their command sufficient numbers of adequately trained personnel;
and the proficiency of its personnel would of course, determine the types of inspection
which could be delegated to any given state agency.
Such a procedure appears to be authorized under section i6i (f) of the 1954 act,60
which provides that the Commission may:
...

with the consent of the agency concerned, utilize or employ the services ...

of any

government agency or any state or local government, or voluntary or uncompensated
personnel, to perform such functions on its behalf as may appear desirable.
Precedent for such use of state officials to carry out federal responsibilities to
provide health and safety protection against radiation hazards may be found in the
administration of the Walsh-Healey Act, section i(e) of which specifies that no
part of certain government contracts may be performed under substandard working
conditions; 61 and section 4 of which contains a clause similar to section i61(f) of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.62 The United States Labor Department, which is

charged with responsibility for the administration of the Walsh-Healey Act, has
entered into written agreements with the appropriate state administrative agencies
in more than twenty-five states making the state agency the sole agent of the federal
government to conduct investigations of plants in the given state to determine compliance with the federal law and administrative standards adopted for its enforcement. Such cooperative federalism under the Walsh-Healey Act points the way
for effective administration of federal health and safety regulations under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954.
The AEC should use state agencies to carry out the federal responsibilities for
health and safety regulations wherever the AEC finds the state agency to be sufficiently equipped with well-trained persons to do the job. Such a procedure would
eliminate unnecessary, irksome duplication, save taxpayers' money, free AEC officials
for work in areas where state authorities cannot do the requisite job, and, in general,
probably achieve the most effective protection against radiation hazards throughout
the country.
For such a program to work, certain guideposts should be observed: the AEC
must know the identity of the state officers who will be charged with federal investigations and must be satisfied with their capabilities; the AEC should pay the state
agencies enough to meet the additional costs incurred by the agency in doing the
AEC work; the types of inspection, the intervals between types of inspection, and
" 68 STAT. 948,
03 49 STAT.
02 49

2036

STAT. 2038

U.S.C.A. § 2201 (f) (Supp. 1954).
(1936), as amended, 56 STAT. 277 (1942), 41 U.S.C. § 35(e) (1946).
(936), 41 U.S.C. § 38 (1946).
42
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the routine and special reports of inspection to be sent to the AEC must be clearly

understood; the AEC must not undermine the state officials by making independent
checks of the installations after the responsibility for them has been delegated to
the state agency, except in emergency situations; enforcement authority should be
retained by the AEC; and there should be a clearly designated state official responsible for administration of the state's obligations and a clearly designated AEC
liaison official.
Such a program could probably be inaugurated in some states today with respect
to isotope users and research reactor operators. Larger reactors, however, require
a host of specialists to assess their potential hazards: physicists, engineers, sanitary
engineers, meteorologists, hydrologists, and geologists in addition to health physicists. Accordingly, it does not seem likely that the AEC will delegate its responsibility for health and safety protection of such installations in the near future.
Initiative for such a program of cooperative federalism can come from the states
well
as from the AEC. And now is the time for initiative. Once standard pracas
tices become adopted, inspectors hired by the AEC, and routines established, it will
be almost impossible to modify the scheme. Furthermore, if there is a jurisdictional
problem in the state, so that responsibility for occupational hygiene is not located
in the public health agency, the AEC may be justifiably reluctant to use either the
public health agency or the agency with responsibility for occupational hygiene until
the two have joined forces to such an extent that the AEC may be sure that it is
not involving itself in an inter-agency dispute. In a similar connection, the United
States Labor Department and the United States Public Health Service have long had
a written understanding with respect to their respective roles in the control and
prevention of industrial health hazards.!3 There is no reason why state agencies
could not reach a similar understanding with respect to their respective roles in
radiation protection.
V
In summary, there are great changes rapidly taking place, both technologically
and legally, in the development of atomic energy for industrial uses. The AEC still
occupies a dominant position in atomic energy matters, but now there is also room
for the states to formulate and implement state-wide policies, both for the encouragement of atomic industrial development within their borders and for the regulation
of risks and hazards which may be unique to the industry. In the area of radiation
protection, the states should take only such action as is consonant with their capabilities for effective enforcement, should cooperate with the AEC in enforcement
of the comprehensive federal regulations rather than adopting conflicting or duplicating regulations, and should limit their own regulations to those hazards not
covered by the AEC regulations. Other areas of state activity should be carefully
"' See Memorandum to Form Basis of Joint Action in the Industrial Hygiene Field Between the Public
Health Service and the Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Standards), executed and dated Sept. ii,
1936, reaffirmed in 1953.
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examined to determine both their exact relation to atomic energy development and
the changes in law, governmental structure, and state policy necessary to further the
best interests of the state in question and its citizens. To coordinate the studies, to
insure that they are completed, to keep the governor and all department heads
abreast of developments in atomic energy within the state and without, some such
office as Coordinator of Atomic Energy Activities should be created, be given the
appropriate powers and financial backing necessary to do the job, and be staffed by
a person of vision and determination who is capable of assuring that atomic energy
developments in the state are commensurate with its potential.
APPENDIX I
DRAFT OF AN ACT TO COORDINATE DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATORY AcTIvITiEs
RELATING TO THE PEACEFUL UsEs OF ATOmIC ENERGY

Be it enacted by etc.
Section z. Declaration of Policy.
a. The state of
endorses the action of the Congress of the United States
in enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to institute a program to encourage the widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful
purposes to the maximum extent consistent with the common defense and security and
with the health and safety of the public; and therefore declares the policy of the State
to bez. To cooperate actively in the program thus instituted; and
2. To the extent that the regulation of special nuclear materials and by-product
materials, of production facilities and utilization facilities, and of persons operating
such facilities may be within the jurisdiction of the State, to provide for the exercise
of the State's regulatory authority so as to conform, as nearly as may be, to the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 and regulations issued thereunder, to the end that there may, in
effect, be a single harmonious system of regulation within the State.
b. The State of
recognizes that the development of industries producing or utilizing atomic energy may result in new conditions calling for changes in
the laws of the State and in regulations issued thereunder with respect to health and
safety, working conditions, workmen's compensation, transportation, public utilities, life,
health, accident, fire, and casualty insurance, the conservation of natural resources, including wildlife, and the protection of streams, rivers, and airspace from pollution, and
therefore declares the policy of the State to bez. To adapt its laws and regulations to meet the new conditions in ways that will
encourage the healthy development of industries producing or utilizing atomic energy
while at the same time protecting the public interest; and
2. To initiate continuing studies of the need for changes in the relevant laws and
regulations of the State by the respective departments and agencies of the State which
are responsible for their administration; and
3. To assure the coordination of the studies thus undertaken, particularly with other
atomic industrial development activities of the State and with the development and
regulatory activities of other States and of the Government of the United States.
Comment on Section z:
The principalfunction of this section is to state the objectives of the state act. The section
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does not seek to set forth findings to provide the bases to sustain the constitutionality of the
statute since, in aligning the enacting State's policy with that of the Federal Government,
the Act should enable the State to enjoy the benefit of the findings declared by Congress
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Section 2. United States Licenses or Permits Required.
No person shall manufacture, construct, produce, transfer, acquire or possess any special
nuclear material, by-product material, production facility, or utilization facility, or act as
an operator of a production or utilization facility wholly within this State unless he shall
have first obtained a license or permit for the activity in which he proposes to engage
from the United States Atomic Energy Commission if, pursuant to the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, the Commission requires a license or permit to be obtained by persons proposing to engage in activities of the same type over which it has jurisdiction.
Comment on Section 2:
Some question has been raised whether, in the absence of a war emergency, the Federal
Government's authority reaches as far as the licensing requirements of the x954 Atomic
Energy Act would extend it. If this doubt should prove valid, a gap would exist in regulatory power. Since the very possibility that such a gap may exist invites challenge, there
is need for the enactment of a statutory provision designed to close the gap without imposing regulatory burdens in this field that State Governments are not equipped to carry
and without giving rise to any conflict between State and Federal authority. This is the
purpose which Section 2 is intended to fulfill.
If the Federal Government requires that a license or permit be obtained for any one
of the type of atomic activities listed in Section 2 whenever that activity is carried out
within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government, no person will be permitted to conduct
that activity wholly within the State without first getting a Federal license or permit. It
will therefore be of no advantage to a person seeking to escape compliance with Federal
licensing requirements to raise jurisdictional issues.
If the Constitutional authority of the Federal Government is held to cover the listed
activities, even when conducted wholly within a State, the State would have concurrent
authority with the Federal Government unless the latter were held to have pre-empted
the field.
If the Federal Government is held to have pre-empted the field, Section 2 will have
been of no legal effect. However, it will not have interfered as a practicalmatter with the
exercise of Federal authority, and it will have served as a deterrent to any search for a
loophole in regulatory authority.
The question may be raised whether this section represents an unconstitutional delegation of future legislative power to the Federal Government by the State Government.
Undoubtedly, from time to time, the Federal Government would announce new license
requirements subsequent to the enactment of the State Act, and it may be argued that
these new requirements represent a change in State law. Section 2 seems reasonably safe
from attack, however, since it merely uses the possession of the Federal license as a fact
indicating that the possessor is a fit person to engage in the activity to which the license
applies. Section 2 is like a statute conferring certain privileges on persons who have been
admitted to the bars of other States. Statutes of this sort are not considered unconstitutional by the fact that the requirements for admission to the bar may be changed by the
other States in the future. And a State may condition the transportof intoxicatingliquor
through its territory on the fact that the consignee in another state may lawfully receive
it. Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944).
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The Opinion of the Justices,239 Mass. 6o6, r33 N.E. 453 1921 deals with a legislative
attempt to punish under State law violations of the Federal prohibition laws which, of
course, were subject to change by the Congress. This was held invalid as an unlawful
delegation of legislative power. One of the sections declared invalid contained a provision relatingto Federalpermits that was like that in Section z. However, the same section
also declared violations of the Federal law to be violations of State law and so was clearly
invalid on the general ground of objection stated by the Court. There was no occasion to
test the separability of the section's provisions, and so the good part fell with the bad.
The activities covered by Section 2 do not extend to "source materials," e.g. uranium
ore. The handling of these is not attended by danger. The application of regulations is
likely to turn on minor variations in ore content. Because of the resulting uncertainty,
the adoption of State laws or regulations relating to source materialsmight, in effect, embarrassactivitiesinvolving ores that contain minute quantities of uranium. Absent a showing or a need for protection, no action now seems called for.
Section 3. Conduct of Studies Concerning Changes in Laws and Regulations with a View
to Atomic Industrial Development.
Each of the following departments and agencies of the State Government is directed to
initiate and to pursue continuing studies as to the need, if any, for changes in the laws
and regulations administered by it that would arise from the presence within the State of
special nuclear materials and by-product materials and from the operation herein of production or utilization facilities, and, on the basis of such studies, to make such recommendations for the enactment of laws or amendments to law administered by it, and such
proposals for amendments to the regulations issued by it, as may appear necessary and
appropriate.
a. The Department of Public Health, particularly as to hazards, if any, to the public
health and safety.
b. The Department of Labor, particularly as to hazardous working conditions, if any.
c. The Workmen's Compensation Commission, particularly as to the time and character of proof of claims of injuries and the extent of the compensation allowable therefor.
d. The Department of Public Highways, particularly as to the transportation of
special nuclear materials and by-product materials on highways of the State.
e. The Public Utilities Commission, particularly as to the transportation of special
nuclear materials and by-product materials by common carriers not in interstate commerce
and as to the participation by public utilities subject to its jurisdiction in projects looking
to the development of production or utilization facilities for industrial or commercial use.
f. The Department of Insurance, particularly as to the insurance of persons and
property from hazards to life and property resulting from atomic development.
g. The Department of Conservation, particularly as to the hazards, if any, to the
natural resources of the State, including wildlife, and as to the protection, if necessary,
of rivers, streams, and airspace from pollution.
h. Such other departments and agencies (including departments and agencies of
political subdivisions of the State) as the Governor may direct and for the purposes
specified by him.
Comment on Section 3:
This section is premised on the supposition that study will disclose a need for a number
of changes in existing laws and regulations to take care of new conditions created by
atomic development for peaceful uses. The statutory directive will justify the use by the
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several departments and agencies of their personnel in making the studies thus called
for, a step that some of them might otherwise be reluctant to take.
In a number of states, important responsibilities affecting atomic energy developments
may be vested in the governments of cities, counties and other political subdivisions
of the State. For example, city planning and zoning boards and building commissioners
exercise powers that could affect the location and construction of reactors within municipal
limits. The language in brackets in paragi'aph (h) is intended to enable local governments
to be brought within the range of the planning activities if this should be thought desirable. In any particular State, special provisions may be needed to reflect the legal
relationships existing between the State and its subdivisions.
The names of departments and agencies used in this draft are given simply as examples.
The list would not be accurate in any single State.
Section 4. Coordinationof Studies and Development Activities.
a. The Governor and Council shall appoint a citizen of this State to serve as adviser
to the Governor with respect to atomic industrial development within the State; as coordinator of the development and regulatory activities of the State relating to the industrial and commercial uses of atomic energy; and as deputy of the Governor in matters
relating to atomic energy, including participation in the activities of any committee formed
by the New England States to represent their interest in such matters and also cooperation
with other States and with the Government of the United States. The person so appointed
shall have the title of Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities.
b. The Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities shall have the duty of coordinating the studies, recommendations, and proposals of the several departments and
agencies of the State (and its political subdivisions) required by Section 3 of this Act with
each other and also with the programs and activities of the Department of Industrial
Development of the State. So far as may be practicable, he shall coordinate the studies
conducted, and the recommendations and proposals made, in this State with like activities
in the New England and other States and with the policies and regulations of the United
States Atomic Energy Commission. In carrying out his duties, he shall proceed in close
cooperation with the Department of Industrial Development.
c. The several departments and agencies of the State (and its political subdivisions)
which are directed by Section 3 of this Act to initiate and pursue continuing studies are
further directed to keep the Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities fully and currently informed as to their activities relating to atomic energy. No regulation or amendment to a regulation applying specifically to an atomic energy matter which any such
department or agency may propose to issue shall become effective until 30 days after it
has been submitted to the Coordinator, unless, upon a finding of emergency need, the
Governor by order waives all or any part of this 3o-day period.
d. The Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities shall keep the Governor and
Council and the several interested departments and agencies informed as to private and
public activities affecting atomic industrial development and shall enlist their cooperation
in taking action to further such development as is consistent with the health, safety and
general welfare of this State.
e. The Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities shall be paid a salary of $
per annum.
Comment on Section 4:
This section is premised on the proposition that what is everybody's business is nobody's
business and therefore seeks to make sure that atomic development and regulationis some-
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body's business. The offlce of the Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities is proposed so that at least one person in a central position in the State Government will be
responsible for seeing that the way is cleared for atomic development and that this is done
without jeopardizing the public interest. If substantially similar statutes were enacted in
all the New England states, the Coordinatorscould cooperate in developing a vigorous
and sensible regional program. In any event, it is to be hoped that the present New England Committee on Atomic Energy will be succeeded by a similar body charged with
encouraging a regional approach to the problems of atomic industrial development and
any Coordinators appointed in the New England States could work closely with that
organization.
Since the Coordinator'sduties would cut across the fields of activity of many departments in the State Government, there is some risk that he would be by-passed by departments that were not alive to the need for cooperation. This problem would be accentuated
if it is decided to bring departments and agencies of county, city and other local governments within the range of the Coordinatorsactivities. Accordingly, to make sure that the
Coordinator can discharge his function effectively, it is provided in paragraph (c) that
he be kept fully informed and given advance notice of proposed regulations so that he
may make his views heard before possibly detrimental action can be taken. This requirement may be waived by the Governor. The provision has some analogy in the various
provisions for advance notice of proposed action that must be given to the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy in Congress. However, the flow of information is not to be wholly
in one direction. Paragraph (d) requires the Coordinator to keep the various agencies
informed of atomic developments.
The work of the Coordinatorwould be on a full-time basis in some States, but in others
part-time service would probably suffice. No attempt has therefore been made in paragraph (e) to specify either a salary for the Coordinator or the terms of his service.
Section 5. Injunction Proceedings.
Whenever, in the opinion of the Attorney General, any person is violating or is about to
violate Section 2 of this Act, the Attorney General may apply to the appropriate court for
an order enjoining the person from engaging or continuing to engage in the activity violative of this Act and upon a showing that such person has engaged, or is about to engage in
any such activity, a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order
may be granted.
Comment on Section 5:
No criminal penalties have been provided for violation of Section 2. The cases, if any, are
sure to be rare, and are likely to be intended to test the scope of Federal controls rather
than to violate willfully a legal requirement known to be valid. To meet this situation,
an injunction proceeding should sufflce.
Section 6. Funds Provided.
There is hereby authorized to be appropriated the sum of $
for the salary of the
Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities and for secretarial, travel, printing, and
other necessary expenses incurred by him in the performance of his duties.
Section 7. Definitions.
As used in this Act,
a. The term "atomic energy" means all forms of energy released in the course of
nuclear fission or nuclear transformation.
b. The term "by-product material" means any radioactive materials (except special
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nuclear materials) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident
to the process of producing or utilizing special nuclear materials.
c. The term "production facility" means (i) any equipment or device capable of
the production of special nuclear material in such quantity as to be of significance to the
common defense and security, or in such manner as to affect the health and safety of the
public; or (2) any important component part especially designed for such equipment or
device.
d. The term "special nuclear material" means (i) plutonium and uranium enriched
in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the Governor
declares by order to be special nuclear material after the United States Atomic Energy
Commission has determined the material to be such; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing.
e. The term "utilization facility" means (i) any equipment or device, except an
atomic weapon, capable of making use of special nuclear materials in such quantity as
to be of significance to the common defense and security, or in such manner as to affect
the health and safety of the public, or peculiarly adapted for making use of atomic energy
in such quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and security, or in such
manner as to affect the health and safety of the public; or (2) any important component
part especially designed for such equipment or device.
f. The term "operator" means any individual who manipulates the controls of a
utilization or production facility.
Comment on Section 7:
The definitions contained in paragraphs (a) and (b) are indentical to the corresponding
ones in the Atomic Energy Act of z954. However, the definitions of "production facility"
and "utilization facility" in paragraphs (c) and (e) respectively have been broadened by
eliminating the provisions in the Federal Act which give the Commission power to narrow the category by rule. After the word "device" in the first line of (c) and "weapon"
in the second line of (e), the Federal Act includes the phrase "determined by rule of the
Commission to be" and also, after the word "device" at the end of each definition, it
includes the phrase "as determined by the Commission.". Both these phrases have been
eliminated.
The reason these definitions have been revised in this way is that their retention in
their original form would have left the applicability of Section 2 to depend on rules of
the Atomic Energy Commission to be made in the future. This might have led to a decision that Section 2 represent an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by the
State to the Federal Government.
Fortunately, for the purposes of Section 2, there is no need to narrow the definitions
as closely as the Federal Act requires since in no case would Section 2 impose any actual
requirement for an intra-state activity unless the Federal Act required a license or permit
for the same type of activity. The scope of the Federal Act thus becomes the final determinant of the scope of Section 2, but in a way that is believed to be constitutional.
In Section 3 the same terms are used in describing the areas of study to be pursued
by the several departments and agencies of the State Government. Despite the fact that
the areas are defined in this Act more broadly than the corresponding areas are defined
in the Federal Act, there would be no reason for the departments and agencies to carry
their studies to the logical extremes permitted by these State definitions.
The definition of "special nuclear material" in paragraph (d) diflers from the Federal
definition by giving the Governor power to enlarge the category, a power conferred by
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the FederalAct on the Atomic Energy Commission. However the Governor is authorized
to take this action only after the Commission has added the new material or materials to
the category. This definition could not be treated as were the definitions of the facilities
since it provided no broad category which the Commission had power to narrow. Fortunately, as a practical matter, there will in all probability be very few additions to the
list so the Governor will not be burdened by the task of keeping the State Act in line with
the Federalin this respect.
The Federal definition also explicitly excludes "source material," an exclusion that
seems to have been added out of excess of caution. To introduce it here would require
a definition of "source material." The precaution seems unnecessary.
Revised Draft
May z5, 5955.
APPENDIX Ift
State

1

2

3

Alabama .............
Arizona .............
Arkansas ............
X
California ..........
...
..
Colorado ............
Connecticut ......... X
X
X
Delaware ..............
Florida .........................
Georgia ...............
Idaho ...............
.
llnoi ................
Indiana ...............
Iowa .................
.
Kansas ...................
*
Kentucky ...........
Louisiana ............................
Maine ..............
Maryland ..........................
X
Massachusetts .......
Michigan ............
..............
Minnesota ..........

4

5

7

X
X
X
X
..
X

.
*.South

X
..
X

X
X
X
..
X
X
X...

X
X

X

I
X

X..
X
X..
X

Missisppi ..........

Missouri ...........
Montana ............

6
X

.

State

1

2

3

4

5

Nebraska ............
Nevada .............
.....................
New Hampshire .................
X
X
New Jersey ..........
New Mexico ...............
New York .........
X
X
.
*
North Carolina........................
North Dakota .......
.....................
Ohio ................
Oklahoma .............................
Oregon .............
X
*
*
Pennsylvania .........
Rhode Island .......................
South Carolina ...............
Dakota .....................
..
Tennessee ........................
XI
Texas ...............
Utah ...............
....................
Vermont ............
..
... .............
Virginia ............
.........
...........
X..
Washington ........................

X..

West Virginia .............

X

Wisconsin ...........
Wyoming..............

7

6
X

X.X.
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
..

X

.........

X

X

I

CoL m e 1: States with statutes specifically authorizing radiation control regulations or governing radiation hazards.
CoLmN
public health
for control of ionizing radiation.
CoLuse 2:
3: States with
with comprebensivo
public health regulations
for regulations
control of specified
types or apects of ionizing radiation.
CoLue 4: States with comprehensiv industrial hygiene
regulations for control of ionizing radiation.
CoLUtM5: States with industrial hygiene regulations for control of specified types or aspects of ionizing radiation.
COLUMNx
6: States reporting satisfactory, informal cooperation with the AEC in matters of inspection and control of isotop us.
CO~LUMN
7: States in which injuris resulting from exessve radiation exposuro are compens~ablo under workmen's compensation lawe.
*Regulations have been proposed but not adopted.
t'Seo alan Adminilraiirg Problems in Radiotion Protcdion, Nucleonics Dec. 1954, p. 8, in which Dra. Tabershaw and Harri exploro
tbo essential elements of radiation protection regulations of a number of governmental; industri, and other organizations.

